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Irreconcilable standpoints
After the end of World War Two, it was difficult for the Catholic Church 
to accept the new Yugoslav government simply because of its communist and 
atheistic ideology, which alone was unacceptable according to Church teach-
ings.  Furthermore, the Church leadership was familiar with the position of the 
ruling Communist Party of Yugoslavia (KPJ - Komunistička partija Jugoslavije) 
on the role of the Church in society.  The Church was also aware that the KPJ 
was under the direct influence of the communist regime in the USSR, which 
had mercilessly clashed with religious communities from the very moment it 
came to power.  Therefore, there developed a fear for the future of the Catholic 
Church and other churches.  Even before the end of the war, when it was 
already clear that the KPJ-led Partisan forces would take power in the coun-
try, a Bishops’ conference was held in Zagreb on 24 March 1945, which issued 
a pastoral condemning the conduct of the Partisan movement.  In the pasto-
ral, the bishops strongly protested the killing of Catholic priests and believers, 
“whose lives were taken away in unlawful trials based upon false accusations 
by haters of the Catholic Church.”1
Meanwhile, among the ranks of the new government, in addition to the 
atheistic worldview and the influence of communist ideology from the USSR, 
a negative attitude developed towards all religious communities, in particular 
towards the Catholic Church because of its alleged negative role during World 
War Two.  Namely, the communist leadership was convinced that the Catholic 
Church, and especially its leaders headed by Archbishop Alojzije Stepinac, 
wholeheartedly supported the pro-Nazi Ustaše and their policies.  It also both-
ered the new regime that the Catholic Church was the only organization out-
side of its control, and with time the only oppositional stronghold when mul-
tiparty politics ceased to exist, a situation the communists could in no way 
accept.
Archbishop Stepinac and the rest of the Church leadership were convinced 
that the principle reason for the tense relations between the Catholic Church 
and the state was Josip Broz Tito’s desire to separate the Church in Croatia 
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from the Vatican; in other words, to create an independent Catholic Church in 
Croatia based on the model of the Orthodox Church in Serbia, and then place 
it under state influence.
Tactics of repression and dialogue
In accordance with the general attitude in their ranks, the representa-
tives of the new government began some moves which antagonized Church-
state relations.  Already on 15 May 1945 Archbishop Stepinac’s car was con-
fiscated, which was subsequently returned, and on 17 May he was arrest-
ed for the first time.2  He was imprisoned in the headquarters of the State 
Security Administration (UDBa - Uprave državne bezbjednosti) on Mlinarska 
Street in Zagreb, where soon thereafter Msgr. Svetozar Ritig – the president 
of the Commission for Religious Affairs, a Partisan, and a big defender of the 
Yugoslav idea – paid him a visit.  However, the Archbishop immediately made 
it clear that he did not want to discuss political issues with Ritig.3
During Tito’s visit to Zagreb, he summoned the representatives of Zagreb’s 
archbishopric for a talk on 2 June 1945.  On that occasion, Tito stated that he 
was not pleased with the conduct of the Catholic clergy during the war, while 
pointing out that he did not condemn the clergy in general.  Emphasizing that 
the relationship between the Church and the state cannot be resolved by decree, 
he asked the Church to prepare a report on how the question of the Catholic 
Church in Croatia should be resolved.  Afterwards he criticized the Holy See 
because of its alleged favoritism towards Italy, believing that the Church need-
ed to be more national, i.e., he wanted “the Catholic Church in Croatia, now 
that we have the proper conditions, to have more independence.”  Declaring it 
to be the fundamental issue, and that all other issues were of secondary impor-
tance, it was already clear that Tito’s main goal was to create an independent 
Croatian Catholic Church based on model of the Serbian Orthodox Church. 
Finally, Tito spoke about the creation of a union of South Slavs, emphasizing 
that in the union there would be more Orthodox believers than Catholics, and 
that relations between these religions needed to be in accordance with the idea 
of drawing Slavic peoples closer.
After Tito’s visit, the representatives of the Zagreb clergy stood in defense 
of the Holy See, emphasizing that they supported the Slavic idea, but that 
Catholics in Croatia did not seek more independence from the Holy See 
than they already had.  The clerical representatives spoke of the character of 
Archbishop Stepinac at that time, as well as his role during the war, express-
ing their hope that Tito would release him.  They also warned of the behavior 
of the representatives of the new government towards the clergy and believers, 
especially in schools and convents.4
2 Giuseppe Masucci, Misija u Hrvatskoj, ed. by Marijan Mikac (Madrid: Editorial Drina, 
1967), p. 200.
3 Aleksa Benigar, Alojzije Stepinac, hrvatski kardinal,  2nd edition (Zagreb: Glas Koncila and 
Hrvatska franjevačka provincija sv. Ćirila i Metoda, 1993), p. 460.
4 Josip Broz Tito, Govori i članci (Zagreb: Naprijed, 1959), pp. 281-283; Službeni vjesnik 
Zagrebačke nadbiskupije (SVZN), no. 2, 1945.
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As a result of this conversation, Archbishop Stepinac was freed the follow-
ing day.  The same day, Tito met with the Papal envoy, Abbot Ramir Marcone, 
and his secretary Giuseppe Masucci in the presence of the president of the 
Croatian government, Vladimir Bakarić.  Marcone warned Tito of the incor-
rectness of his communist politics, denounced the attacks against the Holy See 
in the press, and concluded that the people were not pleased with the current 
atheistic policies.  Tito tried to convince Marcone that in forty days complete 
peace and order would be restored, and that there would be absolute freedom 
of conscience.5
On 4 June 1945, Tito held a meeting with Archbishop Stepinac.  On that 
occasion, Archbishop Stepinac said that he considered the talks between the 
government and bishops to have been useful, but noted that only the Holy 
See could make decisions concerning the Church.  He proposed the creation 
of a concordat, or at least a modus vivendi, as in the former Czechoslovakia. 
Additionally, he defended the role of the Holy See during the war, and sug-
gested to Tito that he meet with the leadership of the Croatian Peasant Party 
(Hrvatska seljačka stranka) as well as some followers of the Ustaša movement 
untainted by war crimes.  Furthermore, he requested that Tito respect human 
lives whenever possible.  During the talks, Tito asked for the Catholic Church’s 
support on the question of Istria and border demarcation with Italy, to which 
Archbishop Stepinac responded that the Catholic Church was most respon-
sible for Istria still being Croatian.  Finally, the archbishop concluded that 
through good will from both sides all difficulties could be overcome.6
From everything that happened at that time, it is not clear why Tito first 
had Archbishop Stepinac arrested, and only later spoke with him.  It is possi-
ble to conclude that through the arrest of the archbishop, Tito wanted to see 
the extent of his influence among the people and the Church, or to see if he 
could soften him up and then get him to cooperate on the issue of creating an 
independent Catholic Church in Croatia.  This was a period when Tito had 
numerous problems with the Allies over the issue of Carinthia and the Julian 
March, as well as an international situation which brought into question the 
survival and stability of the Yugoslav state.  In the context of these conditions, 
it was not advisable to antagonize domestic issues, and the imprisonment of 
Archbishop Stepinac had been a risky move that could have additionally wors-
ened the situation.  However, future developments show that Tito’s settling of 
accounts with Archbishop Stepinac were merely delayed until a more oppor-
tune moment.
Protests of the Catholic Church to state authorities
Despite the meetings which were intended to calm the situation, relations 
between the Catholic Church and the new government progressively wors-
ened.  Because of this, Church officials were forced to frequently send mem-
oranda to the government authorities.  In these memoranda, they protested 
5 Masucci, Misija u Hrvatskoj, p. 203.
6 Benigar, Alojzije Stepinac, pp. 468-469.
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atheistic propaganda among the youth, work on Sundays and holidays, the 
removal of crosses from schools, the assignment of commissars in purely reli-
gious institutes and orphanages, the arrest of bishops and priests, the slander 
of bishops and priests in public meetings, and the appropriation of Church 
property.7  Moreover, they demanded unhindered religious instruction in 
schools, and protested against the designation of religious teachings as an elec-
tive in the lower grades of high school, as well as its complete elimination in 
the upper grades.  There were also complaints about the inhumane attitude 
towards soldiers and civilians in internment camps, and requests that priests 
should be permitted to visit the prisoners in these camps.8  There followed 
memoranda regarding the new laws on education and religious upbringing, 
agricultural reforms, devastated Catholic cemeteries, and similar issues.
The tension between the Catholic Church and the state culminated dur-
ing the Bishops’ conference held from 17 to 22 June 1945.  Immediately at the 
beginning of the conference, the bishops directed a letter to President Tito, 
for the most part consisting of complaints about the government mentioned 
in the earlier memoranda.9  Since no official representative of the government 
responded to the letter, at the conclusion of the conference the bishops draft-
ed a pastoral letter for Catholic believers, which evoked a strong response in 
public.
In the letter the bishops generally enumerated facts which Archbishop 
Stepinac had already mentioned in his memoranda.  In particular they noted 
the murder and arrest of the clergy, claiming that 243 priests had been killed, 
169 were in prison, and eighty-nine were listed as missing, while an addition-
al nineteen seminary students, three monks, and four nuns were also known 
to have been murdered.  They highlighted the case of twenty-eight murdered 
Franciscans in the Široki Brijeg monastery.  Returning to the questions of youth 
education, the requisitioning of Church property, the destruction of graves, the 
confiscation of the Catholic press and print shops, and the other problems pre-
viously mentioned, the bishops concluded: “When we present all of this, our 
dear believers, we do not wish to foster a conflict with the new state author-
ities.  We do not look for this conflict, nor did we in the past.  Our thoughts 
were always directed towards peace and the organization of social and public 
life.”  At the end of the letter, noting that they would not back down from these 
requests under any condition, they demanded “full freedom of the Catholic 
press, full freedom for Catholic schools, full freedom for religious education 
in all grades of elementary and high school, full freedom for Catholic associa-
tions, full freedom for Catholic Caritas activities, full freedom for human indi-
7 Nadbiskupski arhiv Zagreb (NAZ), fond Nadbiskupskog duhovnog stola (NDS), no. 
4122/45.
8 NAZ, NDS, no. 4442/45, Predstavka Nadbiskupskog duhovnog stola predsjedniku vlade 
Federalne Hrvatske Vladimiru Bakariću od 25. lipnja 1945 (Petition of Archbishopric spiri-
tual table to the president of the Croatian Federal government Vladimir Bakarić from 25 June 
1945).
9 Benigar, Alojzije Stepinac, p. 498.
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viduality and its inalienable rights, full respect for Christian marriages, and 
the return of all confiscated institutes and organizations.”10  The letter was read 
on 30 September 1945 in churches across the country.  Afterwards the govern-
ment and the media reported examples of priests who did not, for various rea-
sons, read the letter, in order to show the public disunity within the Church 
regarding the text of the letter.  That in itself was not important, as the letter 
had a strong resonance in the country and abroad.11
The pastoral letter came at an inopportune time for the government, as they 
were preparing elections for the Constitutional Parliament, and the interna-
tional situation was likewise not favorable.  In the report of the “agitation-pro-
paganda work of the KPJ” from early 1946, it was noted that the pastoral let-
ter was “the most significant among a number of enemy actions in the recent 
past,” and was considered to be directed towards mobilizing Catholics against 
the new Yugoslavia.12
Archbishop Stepinac, certain that he would be arrested, planned in advance 
who would represent the archbishopric in case of his absence.  If arrested, the 
diocese would be overseen by two vicars, auxiliary bishop Franjo Salis-Seewis 
and Josip Lach.
The communist authorities were caught off guard, and did not immediate-
ly react.  Even the newspapers remained silent on the issue, awaiting a reaction 
from the politicians.  Vladimir Bakarić first spoke of the letter in an interview 
with Vjesnik on 6 October 1945, in which, among other things, he regretted 
that certain bishops unexpectedly signed the letter.  He concluded that within 
the letter existed words which could result in criminal proceedings according 
to the law.13  That was in itself the announcement for arrest which Archbishop 
Stepinac had predicted.  The political persecution of the Catholic Church and 
the pastoral letter itself began during the time of the pre-election campaign for 
the Constitutional Parliament.
In the meantime, on 18 October 1945, the Vatican officially protested to 
the Yugoslav government about religious persecution, noting that never in the 
history of the Balkans had there existed so much hatred towards the Catholic 
Church.14  With this protest, the Holy See made it clear to the Yugoslav author-
ities that it supported the conclusions of the Bishop’s conference, which was 
extremely important for Archbishop Stepinac in those conditions.
10 Pastirsko pismo katoličkih biskupa Jugoslavije, izdano s općih Biskupskih konferencija u 
Zagrebu, dne 20. rujna 1945. Predragi u Kristu vjernici! Mi, katolički biskupi, sakupljeni na ple-
narnim konferencijama u Zagrebu - one copy on 9 mimeo graphical pages, as well as one typed 
copy on 12 pages, are kept in the archives of Croatian bishops’ conference, files 1945, no. 114 
BK/1945. Mimeo graphical copy has been sent to parochial offices as well as to the state offices, 
and has the value of an original.
11 Benigar, Alojzije Stepinac, p. 501.
12 Radmila Radić, Država i verske zajednice: 1945-1970., Vol. 1, 1945-1953 (Belgrade: Institut 
za noviju istoriju Srbije, 2002), p. 272
13 Vjesnik, 6 October 1945, p. 2.
14 M. Landrecy, Kardinal Alojzije Stepinac (đakovečki Selci: 1989), p.132.
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Finally, on 25 October 1945, Tito himself responded to the pastoral let-
ter, with his main criticism questioning why the bishops did not issue a sim-
ilar letter during the Ustaša regime, or why they did not take a stand against 
the killing of Serbs in Croatia.  Furthermore, he argued that the bishops were 
now ready to sacrifice themselves, but during the time of the Ustaše they were 
silent, not because of fear but because they supported them.  In conclusion, 
he denied that the Catholic Church in Yugoslavia was persecuted, adding that 
only those who were guilty were punished.15
Vladimir Bakarić, in a meeting with the secretaries of local committees 
from northern Croatia on 15 December 1945, announced the beginning of “a 
campaign against priests.”  At another meeting for the secretaries of local com-
mittees from southern Croatia, held on 20 December, he mentioned the start 
of a campaign “to unmask priests as Ustaše nests.”16
The Vatican named the American bishop Joseph P. Hurley as the director of 
the papal nunciature in Belgrade, where he arrived on 30 January 1946.  Tito 
held a meeting with him and asked of him to deliver a request to the Holy 
See to recall Stepinac and replace him with another archbishop, or otherwise 
they would be forced to arrest him.17 The Vatican determined that the rea-
sons given by the Yugoslav authorities were not sufficient to justify such an 
action.18  Tito’s comment, cited above, served as the official announcement for 
Archbishop Stepinac’s arrest.
The Constitutional Parliament of the Federated Peoples’ Republic of 
Yugoslavia (FNRJ - Federativna Narodna Republika Jugoslavija) enacted the 
first constitution of the new state on 30 January 1946, while the government 
continued its media campaign against Archbishop Stepinac and the Catholic 
Church.  In the meantime, the authorities were systematically preparing an 
indictment against the archbishop, waiting for the most convenient moment 
for a trial.
Even though Church-state relations were unmistakably bad even prior to 
the pastoral letter, following its release tensions culminated, and all further 
contacts and attempts at normalization were broken for a considerable time. 
After the pastoral letter the communist regime began an even stronger fight 
with the Catholic Church.  Through the media the state authorities paved the 
way for the archbishop’s arrest, creating a public image of Archbishop Stepinac 
as a criminal and the Catholic Church as a fascist collaborator and enemy of 
the people and state.  Thus the media, day in and day out up until the begin-
ning of Archbishop Stepinac’s trial, carried accusatory articles, preparing the 
public for his arrest when it became politically convenient in both the domes-
tic and international sense.  Media announcements of Archbishop Stepinac’s 
arrest continued in the beginning of September 1946, especially during the 
15  Vjesnik, 25 October 1945, p. 1.
16 Zdenko Radelić, Križari: gerila u Hrvatskoj 1945.-1950. (Zagreb: Hrvatski institut za povijest 
and Dom i svijet, 2002), p. 217.
17 Josip BROZ – TITO, Govori i članci, p. 79.
18  Stella Alexander, Trostruki mit: život zagrebačkog nadbiskupa Alojzija Stepinca (Zagreb : 
Golia, 1990), p. 98.
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course of reporting on the trials of Erih Lisak, Ivan Šalić, and others in Zagreb. 
Even though the preparations for Archbishop Stepinac’s trial took a long time 
and were extensive, the procedure was not started until Tito made the final 
decision.  Tito summoned the head prosecutor, Jakov Blažević, and his team for 
consultations in order to provide a political foundation for the criminal proce-
dure.  Tito had concluded that all attempts to influence Archbishop Stepinac 
were in vain, and that the situation was extremely hostile and irreconcilable.19 
Blažević, in his book Historijsko pamćenje (Historical Rememberance), wrote 
that Tito “cut him off ” at the meeting in Bled, and said to “prosecute him.”20 
Tito’s position on this issue was that the Church could not be above the state.21 
However, another possible reason for Tito’s decision to prosecute Archbishop 
Stepinac was very likely the fact that in July of the same year, the Četnik leader 
Draža Mihailović was tried and executed, so it was important for the authori-
ties to create a balance in order to not provoke a Serb revolt.
The trial was brief, and already by 11 October 1946 the judicial commit-
tee of the Supreme Court reached a verdict sentencing Archbishop Stepinac to 
sixteen years of prison with forced labor and a loss of political and civil rights 
for a period lasting five years.22  Even though the representatives of the gov-
ernment believed that imprisoning Archbishop Stepinac would make it easi-
er to deal with the other bishops, this was not the case.  Apart from a tempo-
rary lull in tensions, relations between the Catholic Church and the state did 
not improve.  In fact, by the early 1950s these relations became increasingly 
strained.
That the issue of Archbishop Stepinac’s imprisonment compromised the 
Yugoslav government, particularly internationally, was evident from the fact 
that in 1950 a group of American senators sought to allow American aid to 
Yugoslavia only on the condition of Archbishop Stepinac’s release.  Realizing 
the need for better relations with the West after the split with the USSR, in 
1951 Tito expressed a willingness to release Archbishop Stepinac from pris-
on if he would leave Yugoslavia for the Vatican or elsewhere.  However, both 
the Holy See and the archbishop refused this offer.  Shortly thereafter, on 5 
December 1951, Archbishop Stepinac was transferred from Lepoglava Prison 
to house arrest in his birthplace of Krašić.  Referring to Archbishop Stepinac’s 
move to Krašić, in March 1952 Tito told a delegation from the First Congress 
of the Association of Yugoslav Students that “We released Stepinac so that we 
could knock a propagandistic weapon out of the Vatican’s hands, the weapon 
that Stepinac is a ‘martyr’.  Now they have problems because Stepinac is out.”23 
19  Jakov Blažević, Povijest i falsifikati (Zagreb [Samobor]: “Zagreb”, 1983), p. 189 (from an 
interview in Sarajevo’s Svijet, 27 October 1982), Josip Hrnčević, Svjedočanstva, 2nd edition 
(Zagreb: Globus, 1986), p. 196, claims that that conversation was kept on Bled, and that before 
they were received by Aleksandar Ranković they did not discuss the trial of Stepinac.
    Josip Hrnčević, Svjedočanstva, 2nd edition (Zagreb : Globus, 1986).
20 Jakov Blažević, Historijsko pamćenje (Zagreb [Samobor]: “Zagreb”, 1982), p. 155.
21 Milovan đilas, Druženje s Titom (Zemun: Goran, 1990), p. 88.
22 Hrnčević, Svjedočanstva, p. 232.
23 Vjesnik, 16 March 1952, p. 1.
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Archbishop Stepinac, still under house arrest, died on 10 February 1960 of 
a blood disease, which provoked considerable public debate because of the 
suspicion that he was systematically poisoned during his imprisonment in 
Lepoglava.  After independence, on 14 February 1992, the parliament of the 
Republic of Croatia drafted a declaration condemning the political process and 
verdict against Cardinal Alojzije Stepinac.24  The trial of Archbishop Stepinac, 
despite the fact that there still exist different opinions on the archbishop him-
self, was without a doubt politically staged by the communist regime.
In addition to Archbishop Stepinac, a number of bishops, priests, nuns, and 
other officials of the Catholic Church were tried in the years immediately after 
World War Two.  There were also several trials against the leaders and offi-
cials of other religious groups in Croatia.  Considering that the legal system 
was an extension of the ruling party, the trials were quick, effective, and mer-
ciless, without any objectivity.  The trials had little semblance of legality, and 
were accompanied by media witch hunts, with the intention of justifying both 
domestically and internationally the accusations of war crimes, treason, and 
collaboration with the enemies of Yugoslavia.  According to the Commission 
for Religious Affairs, on the territory of the Peoples’ Republic (NR -Narodna 
republika) of Croatia from 1944 until 1951 a total of 256 individuals from the 
Roman Catholic Church were sentenced to prison.25  Since this list does not 
include the name of Archbishop Stepinac, it cannot be claimed that this list is 
completely accurate.
Confiscation of Church property
The change of ownership rights through the implementation of various laws 
was carried out after World War Two across Yugoslavia, including Croatia, 
with the goal of socializing private property in accordance with the commu-
nist program.  Those moves hit the Catholic Church particularly hard, since it 
had been one of the largest property owners, and the confiscation of its prop-
erty was carried out very thoroughly.
The political relations between the Catholic Church and the state, which 
were incredibly tense, had an important influence on the procedure for the 
confiscation of the Church’s property in Yugoslavia.  During these difficult cir-
cumstances, the government carried out agricultural reforms, as well as the 
confiscation, expropriation, and nationalization of the Catholic Church’s pos-
sessions.  The agrarian reforms were particularly damaging for the Catholic 
Church, since farmland was one of its most important sources of income.  The 
thorough implementation of agrarian reforms on Church property brought 
it into a difficult material position, and forced believers to take on finan-
cial responsibility for the Church’s continued activity during the already try-
24 Narodne novine, no. 9/92, Zagreb 1992.
25 HDA, KOVZ, box 341, Pregled osuđenih svećenika, časnih sestara i crkvenih funkcionara 
svih vjeroispovjesti na teritoriju  NR Hrvatske od 1944. do 1951. (List of convicted priests, nuns 
and church officials of all religions on the territory of NR Croatia from 1944 to 1951).
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ing postwar conditions.  On the territory of the Zagreb Archbishopric alone, 
between 1945 and 1948 over 70% of the Catholic Church’s agricultural land 
was taken away in the scope of the agrarian reforms.26  Apart from land, these 
reforms also resulted in the confiscation of the Church’s buildings, agricultur-
al reserves, livestock, farming machinery, and tools.27  The bad Church-state 
relations had a critical influence upon the implementation of the reforms, thus 
the government interpreted the law on agrarian reforms and colonization very 
one-sidedly, and carried it out restrictively.  While the agrarian reforms severe-
ly hurt the Catholic Church, they were not the main factors in its relations with 
the state, because other forms of destroying religious freedom were consider-
ably more threatening to the survival of the Catholic Church in Yugoslavia. 
However, the communist regime attempted to convince the public through its 
media that the main reason for the Catholic Church’s unhappiness with the 
new rulers was that they took away the Church’s land and distributed it to the 
peasantry, counting on the sensitivity of the people towards material prob-
lems in the difficult social circumstances after the war.  Despite this propa-
ganda, which probably had a short-term success, time showed that the confis-
cation of Church property, as well as other actions that stifled religions free-
doms, resulted in undesirable – as far as the communist regime was concerned 
– reactions from Catholic believers, who increasingly sympathized with the 
Church, not only for religious reasons, but in order to show resistance to the 
communist regime.
Since even after the agrarian reforms were carried out numerous taxes were 
imposed on the Catholic Church and the land remaining under its control, 
many parishes, unable to pay the taxes, were forced to give away that land 
to peasants, agricultural cooperatives, and various other social organizations 
which they later had problems recovering.28
The property which was not taken from the Church during the agrarian 
reforms was confiscated to a lesser degree through seizures and the national-
ization of private firms, and a greater degree through expropriation.  In addi-
tion to the laws which confiscated Church property, other possessions were 
temporarily occupied by means of various residential laws and decisions by 
National Committees, as well as illegal occupations by the army, police, and 
others.  Subsequently, the Catholic Church spent years trying to evict illegal 
occupants from its buildings and apartments.
The remaining property of the Catholic Church was for the most part con-
fiscated by means of the Law on the Nationalization of Rental Buildings and 
Construction Sites in 1958.  This law left the Church without its most valu-
able real estate, especially buildings and construction sites in the center of 
big cities.  Even though the nationalization of property took place during the 
26 Miroslav Akmadža, Oduzimanje imovine Katoličkoj crkvi i crkveno-državni  odnosi od 1945. 
do 1966. godine : primjer Zagrebačke nadbiskupije (Zagreb: Društvo za povjesnicu Zagrebačke 
nadbiskupije Tkalčić, 2003), p. 119.
27 Ibid., pp. 122–124.
28 More in: M. Akmadža, “Otuđenja nadarbinskoga zemljišta zbog poreznih opterećenja u 
Zagrebačkoj nadbiskupiji 1948.-1955.”, Tkalčić, 9./2005., Zagreb 2005, 123-272.
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gradual improvement of Church-state relations, and the state had given up on 
nationalizing a number of objects it had initially nationalized or had intended 
to nationalize, it did not diminish the consequences of the nationalization of 
Church property.  On the territory of the Zagreb Archbishopric alone, accord-
ing to data from December 1963, eighty-six buildings were nationalized, while 
in all of Croatia a total of 328 buildings and businesses in nine buildings were 
taken by the communist authorities.29
Despite the large material losses resulting from the confiscation of Church 
property, not only did the Catholic Church survive, but its respect among the 
people continuously rose.  This was not only evident by the growing number 
of believers attending Mass services, but also because of the selfless material 
donations to the Church, which enabled it to solidly organize its financial sit-
uation by the mid-1960s.  The weakening of the Church’s economic position 
forced it to dedicate more energy to its spiritual mission, and pressure from 
the regime only improved its image and influence among the faithful.  In addi-
tion to its strengthening in a religious sense, in time the Catholic Church, with 
the help of believers in the country as well as abroad, recovered materially, 
which disconcerted the state authorities.
The confiscation of Church property was not the main issue in resolving 
Church-state problems.  Negotiations on normalizing relations between the 
Vatican and Yugoslavia in the 1960s clearly show that the question of confis-
cated property was not the key concern of the Catholic Church, and the issue 
was not even mentioned in the protocol drafted in 1966.
The attempts by the communist regime to materially weaken the Catholic 
Church in order to prevent it from functioning were falsely based on the 
assumption that the strength of the Church was its material wealth.  This effort 
could not succeed, because the Church became spiritually stronger and more 
accessible to the people the more it was persecuted by the authorities.
Religious education
The upbringing of the youth was one of the key questions in the relations 
between the Catholic Church and the state under the communist regime in 
Yugoslavia.  Under all previous regimes the Catholic Church had freedom in 
teaching religious studies in state schools.  With the arrival of the communists 
to power things changed dramatically, and religious education was incremen-
tally removed from schools, until 1952 when it was completely banned from 
all schools.  However, even when they were allowed in state schools as an elec-
tive during the first few years of communist rule, religious studies were sys-
tematically obstructed by the educational authorities.  Under that kind of pres-
sure, religious education was increasingly shifted from schools to churches, 
but even that was banned by the authorities, who cited a law they themselves 
did not obey, which stated religious studies could only be taught in schools. 
Priests were not given approval to teach courses on religion, or else the approv-
29 M. Akmadža, Oduzimanje imovine, pp. 212 – 213.
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al came at the end of the school year, while children and parents were system-
atically frightened so as to discourage them from attending religious classes.  
Since religion could not be legally banned, the communist authorities 
sought to distance the new generation of youth from the Church through 
their upbringing and education, and raise them in the spirit of socialism.  The 
Catholic Church refused to allow the children to be raised without religion, 
and stubbornly fought for the right for religious upbringing, which was for-
mally guaranteed in the constitution.  The communist regime’s repressive 
methods failed to prevent both the Church and parents from raising children 
in a religious manner, but the authorities did not give up on in the struggle 
to imbue the youth with a socialist worldview.  The Catholic Church success-
fully resisted these endeavors by the authorities, but failed to secure the full 
legalization of religious upbringing of the youth through the educational sys-
tem.  The Church leaders had counted on the agreement between the Vatican 
and Yugoslavia, signed in June 1966, to resolve this question, and its exclusion 
from the text greatly disappointed the bishops in Yugoslavia.  Nevertheless, 
they used every means possible to address the religious upbringing of the 
youth, even though the right to a religious education in state schools was not 
secured until the fall of the communist regime in 1990.30
Religious schools
In 1945, the Catholic Church operated a number of private schools in 
Croatia.  These included the archbishopric and bishopric high schools, a 
Franciscan high school, a Dominican high school on the island of Brač, high 
schools and a teachers’ school for nuns in Zagreb, seminaries, and various 
other theological institutions.31
Responding to the announcement in the state-controlled press about the 
closure of all private schools in the 1945/4632 school year, Archbishop Stepinac 
protested to Vladimir Bakarić on 11 August 1945.33  The majority of seminar-
ies for boys were occupied by the army, which the bishops had noted in the 
pastoral letter of September 1945, in addition to the requisitioning of a num-
ber of other seminaries.
On 2 October 1945, all private schools were closed with the passing of a new 
law, which had the provision that the Ministry of Education could allow cer-
tain private schools with historical traditions or those that provided necessary 
theological training to continue operating.34  Thus, in Croatia only the boys’ 
30 More in M. Akmadža, “Ometanja i zabrane vjeronauka od strane komunističkog režima 
u Zagrebačkoj nadbiskupiji od 1945. do 1966. godine”, Tkalčić, 8./2004., Zagreb 2004, pp 347-
443: Marin Srakić, Zabrana školskog vjeronauka u doba komunizma : kratki prikaz na temelju 
povijesnih izvora s posebnim osvrtom na Republiku Hrvatsku i na područje Đakovačke i Srijemske 
biskupije (Zagreb : Katehetski salezijanski centar, 2000).
31 Benigar, Alojzije Stepinac, p. 480.
32 Vjesnik, 4 August 1945, p. 5.
33 N. Kisić - Kolanović, Pisma zagrebačkog nadbiskupa Alojzija Stepinca predsjedniku nar-
odne vlade Hrvatske Vladimiru Bakariću  1945., Croatica Cristiana  Periodica, no. 29, vol. XVI, 
Zagreb 1992, p. 161.
34 Narodne novine, no. 35, Zagreb, 4 October 1945.
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seminaries with public high schools in Zagreb and Pazin remained open, while 
the committee in Belgrade felt that the archbishopric high school in Zagreb 
it had supervised should also be shut down in 1947, which was opposed by 
Msgr. Ritig.35  As a result of Msgr. Ritig’s intervention, on 15 June 1947 Bakarić 
directed the Ministry of Education to reject the federal government’s decision 
to shut down the archbishopric high school, claiming that their opinions were 
“stupid and formalistic.”36  In their memorandum to the Presidency of the 
FNRJ, sent from a meeting in Ljubljana at the end of July 1947, the Catholic 
bishops commented on the problem of religious schools and the fact that all 
the technical and high schools operated by the Church (the result of centuries 
of cultural efforts) were banned or closed.  Along with the seminaries, high 
schools, and boarding schools, the Church lost control over all of its orphan-
ages.37
Despite the protests of the Church leadership and Msgr. Ritig, the state con-
tinued to obstruct the functioning of religious schools.  For example, on 20 
June 1948, the Ministry of Education decided to shut down the public high 
school that had been attached to the archbishopric high school on Šalata in 
Zagreb.
The situation with religious schools continued to worsen, as children from 
the seminaries were required to obtain their basic education in state schools. 
The Interdiocesan committee for religious affairs in Zagreb fought against 
this move, and requested from the Croatian government that students from 
the first through third grades of the Interdiocesan high school did not have 
to attend seven year schools.38  Reacting to the announcement that students 
from religious schools who did not finish a state elementary school would 
not be permitted to enroll in the Theological College, the Interdiocesan 
committee sent the Presidency of  NR Croatia a letter which stated, among 
other things: “Prohibiting graduates of the Interdiocesan high school from 
enrolling in the Roman Catholic Theological College in Zagreb would mean 
the liquidation of that college, as the main source of students come precisely 
from the Interdiocesan high school, which is why it exists.”39  Related to the 
abovementioned events, the Business Committee of the Bishops’ Conference 
sent a memorandum to the Presidency of NR Croatia’s government on 5 
August 1951.40
However, shortly thereafter, the Catholic Church was shocked by a new 
attack on religious schools.  Namely, the Council for Education, Science, and 
35 HDA, KOVZ, box. 130.
36 Dušan Bilandžić, Hrvatska moderna povijest (Zagreb: Golden marketing, 1999), p. 257.
37 HDA, Osobni fond Svetozara Ritiga (OF Ritig) (Personal fond of Svetozar Ritig), (later OF 
Ritig), box 7, Predstavka katoličkih biskupa Jugoslavije Predsjedništvu vlade FNRJ, od 29. srpn-
ja 1947. (Petition of Catholic bishops of Yugoslavia to the presidency of the FNRJ government, 
29 July 1947).
38 NAZ, NDS, no. 4668 – 1949.
39 NAZ, NDS, no. 4666 – 1949.
40 HDA, OF Ritig, box 4.
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Culture of NR Croatia distributed a circular letter on 31 January 1952, which 
stated that students younger than fifteen could only attend state schools.41
After receiving a request from several bishops, in February 1952 Minister of 
Education Žanko distributed a circular letter to city and county boards of edu-
cation that explained how to enforce the new law, stating that children do not 
have to leave the seminaries as the decision was left up to their parents.42
On 31 February 1952, Minister Žanko sent all the Committees for Education 
and Culture instructions on eliminating religious education as well as private, 
that is, religious schools, concluding that “Since no private or religious schools 
of general educational character have been approved by the law, as stated by 
the constitution, no general educational schools are recognized or accepted.”43
Subsequently this issue was addressed in the Law on Religious Associations 
from 1953, on which the Executive Council of the parliament of NR Croatia 
enacted instructions for enforcing the law in relation to religious schools. 
Therefore, the Council for Education, Science, and Culture of NR Croatia 
would supervise those schools, which accepted only students who complet-
ed eight years of schooling, while seminaries accepted only students from reli-
gious schools.44
The state did not forget about the Roman Catholic Theological College in 
Zagreb, which was a part of the University of Zagreb.  The college was closed 
down on 29 January 1952, when the authorities of NR Croatia decreed that it 
was no longer part of the leading institution of higher education in Croatia.45
Several days later, Msgr. Ritig sent Tito a letter regarding this issue, empha-
sizing that the decision was widely considered to be a hostile act against the 
Catholic Church, and reminding him of his words that the question of the 
Church cannot be resolved by decrees.46
Responding to the exclusion of the Theological College from the University 
of Zagreb, a delegation of Catholic bishops and theology professors trav-
eled to Belgrade to deliver a memorandum to the responsible authorities.47 
Meanwhile, in March 1952 Tito told American journalists asking about the 
issue of the Theological College that “Our constitution does not allow us to 
finance those colleges with the state budget, because the Church is separate 
from the state.”48
Regardless of the difficulties, the leadership of the Bishops’ conference 
informed the Presidency of NR Croatia that the Roman Catholic Theological 
41 NAZ, NDS, no. 1971/1952.
42 HDA, KOVZ, box 139.
43 Srakić, Zabrana školskog vjeronauka, p. 70.
44 Vjesnik, 31 August 1954, p. 2.
45 HDA, KOVZ, box 139.
46 HDA, OF Ritig, box 4.
47 Radić, Država i verske zajednice, vol. I, p. 224.
48 Vjesnik, 13 March 1952, p. 1.
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College would continue to function as an institution of the Croatian bishop-
ric.  It also requested the government to settle all the issues that emerged from 
returning the college under the control of the Church.  Moreover, the leader-
ship asked for state subsidies from the state budget and permits to collect con-
tributions from believers for the needs of the college, as well as the recognition 
of student status regarding eligibility for army service.49
The Committee of Education, Science, and Culture sent a memorandum 
about the letter on 30 November 1952, in which it only notes the reception of 
the bishops’ decision, but does not respond to any of the questions.50  Not even 
after all of the requests, due to the very tense relations between the Catholic 
Church and the state (which had broken off relations with Vatican), did the sit-
uation for the Theological College in Zagreb significantly improve, although 
it remained outside of the University of Zagreb for the remainder of the com-
munist era. 
Religious press
Prior to World War Two, the Catholic Church published 137 newspapers 
on the territory of Yugoslavia in the Croatian and Slovenian languages, as well 
as in the languages of national minorities.51  For the most part the situation 
remained the same during the time of the Ustaša regime.  After the new gov-
ernment came to power in 1945, the situation dramatically worsened for the 
Church press, which the authorities blamed on the lack of paper.  Archbishop 
Stepinac rejected this explanation, citing the fact that soldiers had carted away 
wagonloads of paper from the State print shop and the archbishop’s court for 
use in the KPJ’s print shop “Naprijed”.52  In a petition to Bakarić sent on 21 July 
1945, Archbishop Stepinac commented on the seizure of the State print shop, 
which had been mostly owned by the Church, concluding that “We have come 
to the point where the press attacks us daily, while we are not allowed to print 
a single Catholic publication.  This all happens in an era of war under the slo-
gan of freedom.”53
In the beginning of the postwar period, the only Catholic newspaper was 
the weekly Dobri Pastir (The Good Shepard), which was eventually banned, 
and several official papers and bulletins54 of bishoprics and various orders 
(such as Službeni vjesnik Nadbiskupije zagrebačke, Glasnik sv. Josipa, Vjesnik 
salezijanskog suradništva and others), in which the texts could contain exclu-
sively religious content.  Later, first in Istria and then Zagreb, the religious 
49 HDA, KOVZ, box 140.
50 HDA, KOVZ, box 141, From the letter of the Rect. of the Faculty of Theology in Zagreb to 
the Commission for religious affairs, no. 90/1953, from 20 February 1953.  
51 HDA, OF Ritig, box 7.
52 Kisić - Kolanović, Pisma, p. 147.
53 Ibid., p. 148.
54 HDA, KOVZ, box 126, List of the magazine printed in the National printing-house to the 
beginning of 1946.
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magazine Gore Srca (Raise Your Hearts) was published, while the Association 
of Catholic Priests of Croatia began to issue the monthly magazine Danica 
(Morning Star).55
In their circular letter on the Christian upbringing of youth distributed to 
the faithful in August 1946, the bishops lamented the fact that they could not 
publish Catholic papers which could help with the raising of children.56  As the 
situation with the Catholic press worsened, particularly in those areas where 
the population was mostly Croat, the Catholic bishops of Yugoslavia drew 
attention to these problems in their memorandum to the leadership of the 
FNRJ sent from their meeting in Ljubljana at the end of July 1947.57
 One of the rare legal Catholic weeklies was Gore Srca, initially pub-
lished in Istria by Božo Milanović, an Istrian priest with close ties to the regime. 
Because of technical problems with the printing of this magazine, the Croatian 
Literary Association of Cyril and Methodius in Zagreb took over its publica-
tion, and Canon Pavao Lončar became its editor.  This weekly began appear-
ing in Zagreb on 30 November 1947, but the authorities did not tolerate even 
this publication for long, and constantly sought a reason to ban it.  It contin-
ued to be published, but new problems quickly developed after the authorities 
began to limit the amount of paper allocated for this and other papers.  After 
a short period when Gore Srca was published without too much obstruction, 
in early 1949 individual issues were banned.  For example, on 22 January 1949 
the district court in Zagreb banned issue number three, and several days later 
banned the subsequent issue as well.  The weekly continued to be published 
with minor difficulties until 1951, when it was periodically banned again. 
Finally, on 19 October 1952, because of the article “Can a laic school make up 
for religion,” the current editor, Franjo Grundler, was taken to court for sub-
verting the government of the working people, i.e., for propaganda against the 
state and social system.58  Shortly thereafter, in late 1952, Gore Srca published 
its last issue.59  In the subsequent years, the Catholic Church was prohibited 
from publishing any newspapers other than official bulletins, until the launch-
ing of Glas Koncila (Voice of the Council) in the 1960s, thanks to the amenabil-
ity of the regime during the time of negotiations with the Vatican.60
55 M. J. Mataušić, Katolički tisak u Zagrebačkoj nadbiskupiji, Zbornik u čast kardinala Franje 
Kuharića, (Zagreb: 1995).
56 SVZN, no. 2, 1946.
57 HDA, OF Ritig,  box 7.
58 K. Spehnjak, Uloga novina u oblikovanju javnog mnijenja u Hrvatskoj 1945.-1952., Časopis 
za suvremenu povijest, vol. 25., nos. 2-3, Zagreb 1993, p.180.
59 Ibid., p. 175.
60 Miroslav Akmadža, Katolička crkva u Hrvatskoj i komunistički režim 1945.-1966. (Rijeka: 
“Otokar Keršovani” d.o.o., 2004), pp. 78-80.
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Priest associations
The state authorities encouraged the founding of priest associations 
(Staleška svećenička udruženja) with the goal of breaking Church unity, which 
were supposed to weaken the Church’s power and separate it from the Vatican. 
In forming these associations, the government began with communities where 
the Church authorities were already predisposed to cooperate with the state, 
such as in Istria, Slovenia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina.  Initially, the bishops 
of Yugoslavia did not have a unified position on the creation of class-based 
priest associations; some of them quietly approved, while others immediate-
ly and vehemently opposed it.  The Bishops’ conference decided on 26 April 
1950 that membership in such associations was “redundant” and “not recom-
mended” (Non expedit), but the position of the bishops in applying the deci-
sion were different. Some tolerated the associations and some threatened the 
members with sanctions.61  But the clergy understood this decision different-
ly and still joined the associations.62  There were even some cases where priests 
asked to be forbidden to join them in order to justify to the authorities reasons 
for not being members.63
The communist regime fully supported these associations.  The authorities 
promised priests who joined them social security, pensions, and other bene-
fits, but also used the worse possible methods to pressure those priests who 
refused to join.  They especially took advantage of priests who were impris-
oned; some of them were not only persuaded to join these associations, but 
they were actually given leadership positions upon their release.64
The Bishops’ conference sent a memorandum to the government of the 
FNRJ on 26 September 1952 in which the bishops stated that “these associa-
tions have no characteristics which are required to achieve the goals that they 
have set.  First of all because they are strongly influenced by a political party, 
and also because of the instructions that note the breakings of church disci-
pline and weaken religious life, through which the goals of resolving Church-
state relations will not be met.”  Moreover, the bishops emphasized that they 
would accept the associations only if they conformed to Church laws and were 
under the supervision of the Episcopate.65  They also unanimously declared 
“Non licet” (it is forbidden) regarding the class-based priest associations, 
which was a sharp condemnation and banned their further development.66
The reaction of the state authorities and the press was quite severe.  The 
district attorney of NR Croatia immediately summoned bishops Franjo Salis-
Seewis, Dragutin Nežić, Smiljan Čekada, Stjepan Bauerlein, and Archbishop 
61 HDA, OF Ritig, box 136.
62 Benigar, Alojzije Stepinac, p. 643.
63 Alexander, Trostruki mit, page 137
64 Benigar, Alojzije Stepinac, p. 643.
65 Ibid., p. 644
66 Declaratio de associationibus cleri, published on the conference of Yugoslavian bishops in 
Zagreb, 22-25 September 1952. HDA, KOVZ, box 141.
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Josip Ujčić for questioning.  He accused them of misusing the Church for 
political purposes, obstructing the freedom of association of citizens, and rais-
ing an alarm by encouraging the violation of the constitution.  The decision 
by the bishops to ban the class-based priest associations upset the commu-
nist regime so greatly that the Yugoslav government sent the Vatican a let-
ter on 1 November 1952, accusing the Holy See of meddling in the internal 
affairs of the FNRJ.67  In the meantime, the Yugoslav government learned that 
Archbishop Stepinac would be named a cardinal, which was deemed by the 
authorities to be an additional “slap in the face,” prompting them to break off 
diplomatic relations with the Vatican.  In their reaction to the break in rela-
tions, the representatives of the Yugoslav government cited the issue of class-
based priest associations as one of the key reasons for the government’s deci-
sion.  In spite of the numerous difficult issues which hampered the relations 
between the Vatican and Yugoslavia, the break came primarily because of the 
Vatican’s recommendation to Yugoslav bishops to forbid the class-based asso-
ciations.  Since this came at the same time as the crisis over Trieste, during 
which the Yugoslav government accused the Vatican of siding with Italy, the 
time was ripe for a final break in diplomatic relations, and the promotion of 
Archbishop Stepinac to cardinal served the Yugoslav authorities as justifica-
tion for that decision.
In contrast to Bosnia and Herzegovina and Slovenia, establishing the class-
based priest associations in Croatia did not go smoothly, and the initial com-
mittee was established only at the end of 1952.  The bishops in Croatia ener-
getically resisted the founding of these associations, and Archbishop Stepinac, 
in spite of his isolation, used every opportunity to warn the clergy of their 
dangers.
The preparatory committee for the priest associations in its bulletin of 14 
February 1953 explained the goals of the organization and asked its members 
to fully support the national authorities.  Furthermore, the committee stat-
ed that it did not want to create divisions within the Church, nor establish a 
national Church separated from the Vatican.  It also emphasized that it recog-
nized the spiritual authority of the Holy See, and that its work followed Church 
law and the rules of the Holy Church.68
Shortly after the establishment of the first preparatory committees for the 
regime’s Catholic associations in Croatia, the bishops used various means to 
pressure priests to not join the associations, and disciplined those who did 
join.  These moves by the bishops were regularly reported in the press in order 
to vilify them as persecutors of those priests who wanted to work with the 
state authorities.  Since the associations were so important to the communist 
regime, the authorities punished those bishops who were disciplining clergy in 
the associations.  Thus, bishops Salis-Seewis and Lach, as well as Mijo Pišonić, 
the secretary of the Zagreb archbishop, were taken to court and found guilty, 
67 Vinko Nikolić (ed.), Stepinac mu je ime, Vol. 1 (Munich-Barcelona: Knjižnica hrvatske 
revije, 1978), p. 391
68 HDA, KOVZ, box 141.
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with the explanation that the priest associations were secular and not Church 
organizations, and therefore the Church leadership had no business meddling 
in their activities.69
In spite of the bishops’ resistance, the founding assembly of the Class-based 
Catholic Priest Association of NR Croatia was held in Zagreb on 12 November 
1953.  The representatives of the state authorities ensured that the assembly 
was well-attended and as successful as possible.  The president of the Istrian 
association, Božo Milanović, testified that the director of UDBa compelled the 
Istrian members to attend, threatening to confiscate buildings belonging to 
seminaries and ban the publication of Istarska Danica (Istrian Morning Star) 
and prayer-books in Pula.  Since the priests in Istria abided by the 1952 deci-
sion of the bishops to ban the regime’s associations, they decided not to attend 
the founding assembly in Zagreb.  However, due to the good relations between 
Milanović and the authorities, the threats by UDBa were not carried out, 
although bishops Nežić and Pavlišić were summoned for military service.70
Archbishop Stepinac had no doubts about his position on the question of 
the associations.  He instructed his deputies to immediately suspend any priest 
who joined the associations, and called on everyone to reflect upon the words 
of Jesus: “The student is not above the teacher.”71  In spite of the harshness 
of the archbishop’s words, he understood the position of the priests who had 
joined the associations, and was ready to forgive them if they left.  In a letter to 
Stjepan Bakšić, the general vicar of the Zagreb Archbishopric, he emphasized 
that he only wanted the priests in the associations to return to the true path, 
and that he was ready to forgive them from the bottom of his heart for their 
errors and mistakes.  He pointed out that he was hurt the most by the “persis-
tence and hardness in evil,” in which case it was necessary “to cut off the bad 
limb in order to preserve the body.”72
After he took over the Zagreb Archbishopric, Archbishop Franjo Šeper 
visited the president of the Croatian government, Vladimir Bakarić, on 7 
December 1954.  Archbishop Šeper stated that the question of the regime’s 
associations for priests was problematic because they were organized without 
the cooperation of the bishops.  He claimed that the government organized the 
associations with the help of UDBa, which was forcing corrupt priests (alco-
holics, womanizers, tax evaders, etc.) to enter into them.  The archbishop once 
again made it clear that the Vatican had forbidden the associations, to which 
Bakarić responded that the Holy See had left it up to the Croatian bishops to 
decide on the issue.73  This meeting did nothing to change the ongoing con-
69 Vjesnik, 17 September 1953, p. 2.
70 Božo Milanović, Moje uspomene : 1900-1976 (Pazin and Zagreb: Istarsko književno društvo 
sv. Ćirila i Metoda and Kršćanska sadašnjost, 1976). p. 193
71 Juraj Batelja, Živjeti iz vjere :duhovni lik i pastirska skrb kardinala Alojzija Stepinca (Zagreb: 
Nadbiskupski Duhovni stol, 1990), p. 271.
72 Ibid., p. 273.
73 J. Kolarić, Kardinal Franjo Šeper kao nadbiskup koadjutor i nadbiskup zagrebački, Šeper 3, 
Veritatem facientes in caritate, in: Željko Tanjić (ed.) Zbornik radova Međunarodnoga simpozi-
ja o kardinalu Franji Šeperu povodom 20. obljetnice smrti, Zagreb, 7. - 8. studenoga 2001., Rim, 
29. - 30. studenoga 2001., (Zagreb: Glas Koncila and Kršćanska sadašnjost, 2003), pp. 119-120.
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flict between the Church and state authorities on the issue of the associations; 
in fact, the conflict became even more intense.
The actual associations had practically no independence in their activities. 
All of their moves, including the smallest details, were decided during meet-
ings of the Commission for Religious Affairs of NR Croatia.  The fact that the 
average age of the members of the associations was high (sixty-one years) wor-
ried the Religious Commission, and it was apparent that they were not getting 
any younger nor were they expanding the membership.  Additionally, there 
was an increase in alcoholism among the members, as well as the loss of cleri-
cal appearance and reputation.74  The secretary of the Religious Commission, 
Zlatko Frid, concluded in one report that certain members of the associa-
tions had legalized their ties with operatives from internal affairs, and that 
special attention should be paid to this as it could seriously harm the associa-
tions.75  In early November 1959, the Croatian Religious Commission report-
ed that the members of the associations were for the most part inactive and 
pessimistic, and that meetings and various conferences were generally initiat-
ed by the Secretariat for Internal Affairs and the Religious Commission.76  It 
was also mentioned that it seemed as if UDBa was responsible for the devel-
opment of the associations, so many priests refused to join.  The increasing 
contacts between the bishops and the state authorities worried the members 
of the associations, who feared that a normalization of Church-state relations 
could lead to their abolition.  The Religious Commission increasingly realized 
that there were many individuals in the governing board that were damaging 
the reputations of the associations and that a change was necessary, namely a 
younger leadership composed of active and decent priests.77 
In the annual report of the Commission for Religious Affairs of Croatia, 
issued in February 1962, it was admitted for the first time that priests were 
offered a number of incentives to join the associations (health and social insur-
ance, amnesty from criminal prosecution, financial aid, etc.), and that many of 
those who had joined had been released from prison.  In fact, the report noted 
that that source of new members was practically exhausted (in 1961, 46% of 
the members in the associations had been released from prison, where they 
were serving sentences primarily for political violations or for “collaborating 
with the Ustaša regime”).78
After the normalization of relations between the Vatican and Yugoslavia in 
1966, the members of the associations began to question the continued exis-
tence of the organizations, and whether or not they lost their purpose.79  The 
74 HDA, KOVZ - records, book 1.
75 HDA, KOVZ, box 38, Pov. 90/1 – 1958.
76 HDA, KOVZ - records, book 1.
77 HDA, KOVZ - records, book 2.
78 HDA, KOVZ - records, book 4, appendix no.10.
79 Letter of Filip Prpić to the Main committee of associations, from 23 March 1967, HDA, 
Fond Društva katoličkih svećenika SR Hrvatske (Društvo), box 1.
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Religious Commission attempted to revive the activities of the associations 
and increase their membership, with little success.  By the end of 1969, the 
Commission stated that the associations proved to be unprepared, inadequate-
ly staffed, and too conservative to adjust to the new changes in Church and its 
relations with the state.80
Negotiations and a renewal of diplomatic relations between the 
Vatican and Yugoslavia
After the deaths of Pope Pius XII in 1958 and Cardinal Alojzije Stepinac in 
1960, the state authorities in Yugoslavia attempted to show that these two indi-
viduals were the main culprits for the bad relations between the Church and 
state, and publicly announced that they were ready to improve the relationship 
with the Catholic Church.  Furthermore, they sought to portray the cardinal’s 
successor, Archbishop Franjo Šeper, as an individual ready for a dialogue with 
the state authorities, even though he did nothing to indicate this willingness. 
In fact, he was of a similar mindset as Archbishop Stepinac, and avoided meet-
ing with government representatives unless it was absolutely necessary.
As the number of contacts between the representatives of the Catholic 
Church and the state authorities increased, the tense atmosphere gradually 
improved.  The state authorities also warned the local authorities that admin-
istrative measures towards the clergy should be replaced with political mea-
sures whenever possible.81
The first concrete efforts to begin negotiations about normalizing relations 
between the Vatican and Yugoslavia were initiated in the first half of 1960 by 
Msgr. Aloisi Masella, a close associate of Cardinal Alfredo Ottaviani, with the 
advisor to the Yugoslav ambassador in Rome, Miroslav Majer.82
On 12 March 1960, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the FNRJ sent instruc-
tions to Yugoslav embassies on how to conduct possible talks with the Catholic 
Church, i.e., the Vatican.  It emphasized that the Vatican seemed ready for 
a new policy towards Yugoslavia, noting that the Holy See was less tolerant 
towards anti-Yugoslav émigrés, softened its tone in the press and on the radio, 
and allowed for greater contact between bishops and Yugoslav authorities, 
among other things.  The fact that the death of Cardinal Stepinac could facil-
itate a more tolerant relationship between the state and the Catholic Church 
was emphasized.  In order to present a unified position on possible negoti-
ations, the instructions warned that it was not necessary to show any initia-
tive or interest in renewing diplomatic relations, but rather use the situation 
to obtain as much information on the Vatican’s position and reject any sugges-
tion that Yugoslavia was to blame for the break in relations.83
80 HDA, KOVZ - records, book 12.
81 HDA, KOVZ, box 40, Pov. 8/1-60.
82 HDA, KOVZ, box 41, Pov. 131/1-60, Elaborat iz srpnja 1960., “Odnosi Vatikan-Jugoslavija”, 
p. 62.
83 Radić, Država i verske zajednice, vol. II, p. 454.
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In late July 1960, a meeting of the Cardinal’s Commission for Foreign Affairs 
determined that it was necessary to normalize relations with Yugoslavia, first 
of all in order to allow a modus vivendi between the bishops in Yugoslavia and 
the state authorities, and secondly to restore the severed diplomatic relation-
ship.  Pope John XXIII allegedly announced that he was personally interest-
ed in normalizing relations with Yugoslavia, and instructed Cardinal Dominik 
Tardini and the president of the Bishops’ conference, Belgrade’s Archbishop 
Josip Ujčić, to pursue that goal.84
The first real reaction from the Catholic Church in Yugoslavia to the 
improvement in Church-state relations came out of the annual Bishops’ confer-
ence held in Zagreb from 20–23 September 1960, when the bishops announced 
their unanimous agreement with the efforts of the Yugoslav government to 
normalize its ties with the Vatican.  In a letter to the Federal Executive Council 
(SIV - Savezno izvršno vijeće), the bishops stated that they believed normaliz-
ing relations would be a great benefit for both the Church and the state, which 
would consolidate the situation inside Yugoslavia and bolster Yugoslavia’s 
image internationally.  The bishops expressed their readiness to fully support 
any serious endeavors to find a truly healthy and long-term modus vivendi 
between the Church and Yugoslav state.  However, they warned that ultimately 
sovereign power in the Catholic Church was held by the Vatican, i.e., the Pope, 
and neither individual bishops nor an association of bishops could negotiate 
with state representatives on this issue, let alone reach a final agreement.
In order to create a favorable atmosphere for improved Church-state rela-
tions, the bishops indicated that the Yugoslav government had to resolve some 
issues, such as problems concerning catechism, religious rights of soldiers and 
prisoners, the celebration of religious holidays, the obstruction of religious 
schools, the return of confiscated Church property, the repair and construc-
tion of churches, the return of church registry books, freedom of the Church 
press, and the question of priest associations.85
The reaction of the authorities towards this memorandum was generally 
positive.  At a meeting of the Commission for Religious Affairs of NR Croatia 
held on 13 October 1960, it was concluded that the Bishops’ conference had 
been peaceful, and that the bishops’ letter indicated their encouragement for 
the reinstatement of diplomatic relations.  Concerning the bishops’ demands 
in the letter, the Commission noted that these were issues that had been con-
stantly repeated, but were presented in a modest tone.86
According to Msgr. Agostin Casaroli, later the Vatican’s chief negotiator, 
Archbishop Ujčić raced to the Vatican greatly encouraged by the reaction of 
the Yugoslav government.  However, Archbishop Ujčić encountered much less 
optimism at the Vatican than he had expected.  The question of beginning 
talks on a modus vivendi still needed to be fully studied, and regardless of the 
84 Ibid. (author does not show the source of the mentioned data).
85 HDA, KOVZ, box 41.
86 HDA, KOVZ - records, book 2.
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signals from the state authorities that they would be willing to improve the 
situation of the Catholic Church in Yugoslavia, too many contentious issues 
remained to facilitate immediate negotitations.87
During 1962 there were no serious moves from either side regarding negot-
iations between the Vatican and Yugoslavia.  The state authorities believed that 
further progress on negotiations was delayed becuase the bishops were awai-
ting the conclusions of the Second Vatican Council, in particular regarding 
the work of the Church in communist societies.88 
The Second Vatican Council was held in the Vatican from 11 October 1962 
until 8 December 1965.  During that time Pope John XXIII was especially 
engaged in peacefully resolving the Cuban Missile Crisis and issued a gener-
al call for peace in the world.  The Yugoslav government reacted positively to 
the Pope’s politics, and decided to give greater support to those bishops who 
thought along similar lines as the Pope.89
The first indications of possible negotiations between the Yugoslavia and 
the Vatican appeared in early 1963, when, according to Casaroli, the Yugoslav 
ambassador in Rome, Ivo Vejvoda, expressed the Yugoslav government’s inter-
est in contacts with the Holy See.90
The Federal Commission for Religious Affairs prepared a number of posi-
tions to be taken by Vejvoda in further negotiations, such as the need for the 
Vatican to influence Yugoslav bishops in resolving their relations with the 
state. Vejvoda was advised to not show a great interest in contacts with the 
Church, but if the Vatican suggested them, he was to hear what the Vatican’s 
representatives had to say and to indicate the issues important to the Yugoslav 
side.  He was also instructed to make it clear that all specific questions of inter-
est to the Church could and should be resolved between the bishops and the 
authorities in Yugoslavia.91
Shortly thereafter, in May 1963, the first informal encounters between the 
Yugoslav government – represented by the minister-advisor of the embassy 
in Rome, Nikola Mandić – and the Vatican took place.  The new pope, Paul 
VI, who succeeded Pope John XXIII in June 1963, authorized his associates to 
continue the contacts in an informal manner.92
The main goals of the Vatican in the negotiations, according to the analy-
ses of the Yugoslav authorities, were to strengthen the position of the Church 
in Yugoslavia, prepare the terrain for resolving relations with other socialist 
countries, and ease the difficulties in which the Catholic Church found itself 
around the world, as well as the pursual of Italian national interests.
87 Agostino Casaroli, Mučeništvo strpljivosti, Sveta Stolica i komunističke zemlje 1963.-1989. 
(Zagreb: Kršćanska sadašnjost, 2001), p. 315.
88 HDA, KOVZ, box 46, Pov. 113/1-1962.
89 HDA, KOVZ, box 47, Pov.147/1-1962.
90 CASAROLI, Mučeništvo strpljivosti, p. 318.
91 HDA, KOVZ, box 49, Pov. 2471-1963.
92 Agostino Casaroli, Mučeništvo strpljivosti: Sveta Stolica i komunističke zemlje 1963. - 1989., 
p. 318.
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Regarding the benefits to Yugoslavia, it was noted that improved relations 
would give support to positive trends in the Catholic Church and in the world, 
and would encourage moderate forces and tendencies in the policies of the 
Vatican.  Furthermore, to some degree it would neutralize reactionary circles 
in the Vatican, anticommunist propaganda, and the anti-Yugoslav activities of 
émigrés.93
In late November 1963, bishops from Yugoslavia met with Pope Paul VI, 
who expressed satisfaction at the improvement of Church-state relations.  He 
also authorized the bishops to notify the Yugoslav authorities that the Catholic 
Church sought nothing more than elementary religious freedoms, and encour-
aged them to cooperate with the authorities in advancing negotiations on rela-
tions between the Church and state.94
The negotiations between the Vatican and Yugoslavia became official in 
June 1964 with the exchange of memoranda with a stated list of the issues 
the two sides wished to discuss in the course of the negotiations.95  Before 
the exchange of the memoranda, talks were held in Rome between Mandić 
and V. Dobrila on the Yugoslav side, and Casaroli and Luigi Bongianin rep-
resenting the Vatican.  They exchanged lists of questions each side wished 
to see resolved.  The Vatican listed its priorities as: applying the principles of 
freedom of conscience and religion for all categories of citizens and respect-
ing those principles; the neutrality of the state in relations between antireli-
gious and atheistic organizations on one side, and religious associations on the 
other; the issue of religious education and military service for priests; the free-
dom of religious ceremonies and the giving of the sacraments; the freedom of 
the Catholic press and priest associations; the issue of Church buildings and 
temples; the equality of priests under the law; and the freedom of communica-
tion with the Vatican.  Issues of lesser importance to the Vatican included: the 
fate of the Church’s register books, religious schools, and Catholic laic organi-
zations; taxes on churches and priests; changing the law on the nationalization 
of buildings and construction sites; and considering the decrees on the legal 
position of religious communities.  The Yugoslav side, in addition to the issues 
mentioned above, wished to resolve problems with the role of the authorities 
in naming bishops, the borders of the bishoprics, the condemnation of the 
political activities of the clergy (especially those in emigration), and the ques-
tion of priest associations (such as the Institute of Saint Jeronim and others).96
The Catholic bishops, despite their reservations as to the final outcome of 
the talks, advised the Vatican to not break off negotiations, calculating that it 
would ultimately be beneficial for the Church to restore the relations broken 
off in 1952.  On the other side, the Yugoslav government insisted on reach-
ing some kind of agreement, although excluding the possibility of changing 
93 Ibid., pp. 496-499.
94 HDA, KOVZ, box 52, Pov. 22/1-1964.
95 Casaroli, Mučeništvo strpljivosti, p. 318.
96 Radić, Država i verske zajednice, vol. II, pp. 505-506.
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the general and one-sided decrees which determined the legal status of the 
Catholic Church.  This agreement was seen as a necessary condition for rein-
stating official relations with the Vatican.97
On 15 January 1965, Pope Paul VI met with Vejvoda, the Yugoslav ambas-
sador in Rome, at his request.  In the name of the Yugoslav government, 
Vejvoda thanked the Pope for the aid sent to help the victims of natural disas-
ters which had struck Skoplje and Zagreb.  However, the real reason for the 
meeting was to outline the Yugoslav position on Church-state relations, and to 
determine the Pope’s opinion on these matters.  The Pope responded by saying 
the Church had no interest in meddling in the political affairs of Yugoslavia, 
or to seek special privileges, adding that he thought the Yugoslav bishops were 
competent individuals.  He expressed hope that the negotiations would end 
successfully, and repeated several times the necessity of allowing the Catholic 
Church to be involved in the upbringing of the youth.  Because this was the 
first time a representative of the Yugoslav government had an audience with 
the Pope since the break in diplomatic relations, it attracted the attention of 
journalists and the international public.98
The bishops were relatively reserved about the agreement, fearing that 
the Vatican would be deceived by the Yugoslav regime.  Cardinal Šeper and 
the other bishops did not see any use in an agreement which in fact changed 
nothing, since the authorities insisted on keeping the general legal frame-
work under which the Catholic Church had already been functioning in com-
munist Yugoslavia.  The bishops favored the idea to first exchange emissar-
ies between the Vatican and Yugoslavia, and only then sign the agreement, 
once the Vatican’s delegates had an opportunity to observe the situation on 
the ground.  The Cardinal and bishops were also not pleased with some of the 
statements which were to be issued by the Vatican, regarding priest associa-
tions and the clergy in emigration, but they in no way wished to break off the 
negotiations.99
The bishops from Yugoslavia held several meetings in Rome, where, on the 
request of the Vatican, they discussed the protocol of the negotiations.  In their 
reply to the Vatican, the bishops opposed the points in the agreement about 
émigré priests, as this would give the Yugoslav authorities too much freedom 
to interfere in the work of foreign clergy and enable them to put pressure on 
priests for their activities.  A similar view was held on the issue of the Institute 
of Saint Jeronim, i.e., regarding the education of priests abroad.  The bish-
ops paid particular attention to the question of the Vatican’s representative in 
Yugoslavia, whose arrival they insisted upon, believing that this would be the 
only gain of negotiating with Yugoslavia.  The Vatican was pleased with the 
positions of the bishops.100 
97 Casaroli, Mučeništvo strpljivosti, p. 322.
98 Ibid., p. 511.
99 Ibid., p. 322.
100 Radić, Država i verske zajednice, vol. II, p. 521.
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On 1 May 1966, the Pope announced the beginning of the last phase of 
negotiations, and on 26 May he received Cardinal Šeper, who gave him a 
memorandum from the bishops against the signing of the protocol and call-
ing for a reevaluation of the entire issue.  Ultimately, Cardinal Šeper, respect-
ing the Pope’s decision, accepted the signing of the protocol but suggested 
that it should not be published.  He also asked that the bishops be allowed 
to announce that the same documents were not formulated in accordance 
with the suggestions and agreement of the Yugoslav bishops.  However, it was 
impossible to not publish the documents, since the Yugoslav authorities could 
easily release them to the public.  The decision to sign the protocol was reached 
after all, since it was evident that not signing it could put the Catholic Church 
in Yugoslavia into an even more difficult position than before.101
In Belgrade, on 25 June 1966, the Yugoslav authorities and the representa-
tives of the Vatican signed the protocol, which confirmed that the two sides 
agreed on the exchange of semi-official emissaries.  According to the agree-
ment, the Vatican needed to appoint an apostolic delegate based in Belgrade 
who would also act as an envoy to the Yugoslav government, while Yugoslavia 
likewise had to send an envoy to the Holy See; both would enjoy the privileg-
es and immunities of true diplomatic representatives.  The protocol was signed 
by A. Casaroli in the name of the Vatican, while M. Morača signed on behalf of 
the Yugoslav government.102
The text of the protocol, among other things, guaranteed the Catholic 
Church in Yugoslavia the freedom to conduct religious work and ceremonies. 
The appropriate organs of social-political associations would provide all citi-
zens with legal guarantees protecting their freedom of conscience and freedom 
of religion.  The government expressed a readiness to take into consideration 
cases which the Vatican found problematic.  The government also accepted 
the competencies of the Vatican in its jurisdiction over the Catholic Church in 
Yugoslavia, and the issue of Church character, unless it opposed the internal 
order of Yugoslavia.  The bishops of the Catholic Church in Yugoslavia were 
permitted to maintain contacts with the Vatican, considering that those con-
tacts had an exclusively religious character.
On the other hand, the Vatican confirmed that the activity of Catholic 
priests should be held within religious and church frameworks, and therefore 
they could not misuse their religious and church duties for any political pur-
poses.  It was also ready to consider cases the Yugoslav government found nec-
essary to have an opinion on from the Vatican, such as those concerning polit-
ical terrorism or other criminal forms of violence.  If the Yugoslav govern-
ment judged that some priests participated in those kinds of acts harmful to 
Yugoslavia, the Vatican was prepared to consider such events, take over the 
procedure, and apply possible measures that canonic law prescribes for such 
cases. 
101 Casaroli, Mučeništvo strpljivosti, pp. 358-361.
102 HDA, KOVZ - records, book 8, appendix to clause 1.
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Finally, the protocol confirmed the readiness of the Vatican and the Yugoslav 
government to exchange their emissaries.103
Cardinal Šeper, in talks with the president of the Federal Religious 
Commission, Vjekoslav Cvrlje, held after signing the protocol, stated that he 
supported the agreement but had serious reservations with it, which he also 
mentioned in Rome, i.e., that the biggest flaw of the agreement was that it did 
not solve the basic issue of religious education in schools.  But he added that 
he hoped it would be adequately solved in the process of improving relations 
between the Church and the state.104
 The exchange of emissaries took place in the middle of November 
1966, when first the emissary of Yugoslav government, Vjekoslav Cvrlje, 
arrived in the Vatican, followed by the arrival of the Vatican’s apostolic emis-
sary, Mario Cagna, in Belgrade.105 Full diplomatic relations between the 
Vatican and Yugoslavia were reinstated in 1970.
Translated by Denis Pavić
103 SVZN, no. 6/1966.
104 HDA, KOVZ - records, book 8, Zapisnik sa sjednice Komisije za vjerska pitanja 
SRH, od 5. VII. 1966. (Protocol from the conference of the Commission of religious 
questions of SR Croatia, 5 July 1966).
105 Glas koncila, 4 December 1966.
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Die Lage der Katholischen Kirche in Kroatien zwischen 
1945 und 1970
Zusammenfassung
Was die Beziehungen zwischen der Katholischen Kirche und dem kommunis-
tischen Regime in Jugoslawien anbelangt, kann man feststellen, dass der Zeitraum 
zwischen 1945 und 1970 der stürmischste von allen anderen während der Existenz 
vom sozialistischen Jugoslawien war. Diesen Zeitraum kann man in drei Teile 
einteilen. Den ersten Teil vom Mai 1945 bis Ende 1952 kennzeichnet der Gegensatz 
zwischen der Katholischen Kirche und dem kommunistischen Regime und er endet 
mit der Unterbrechung der diplomatischen Beziehungen zwischen Jugoslawien und 
Vatikan. Den zweiten Teil charakterisiert die Beruhigung der Beziehungen zwischen 
Kirche und Staat zwischen 1953 und 1960, das ist eine Periode, in der das repräs-
sive Verhältniss des kommunistischen Regimes gegenüber der Katholischen Kirche 
allmählich nachlässt, aber das Regime versucht ebenfalls ihre Einheit und ihren 
Einfluss auf die Gläubigen abzuschwächen. Die dritte Periode beginnt mit dem Tod 
von Kardinal Stepinac, 1960, als das kommunistische Regime die Initiative für den 
Beginn der Gespräche zwecks Normalisierung der Beziehungen mit der Katholischen 
Kirche ergriff, und die Verhandlungen mit ihr fanden gleichzeitig mit dem Zweiten 
Konzil von Vatikan statt, was ein entscheidender Wendepunkt in der Politik der 
Katholischen Kirche gegenüber Atheismus und der atheistischen Gesellschaft darstell-
te. Das erleichterte die Arbeit am Abkommen über Normalisierung der Beziehungen 
zwischen Vatikan und Jugoslawien. Resultat dieser Normalisierungsbemühungen 
waren die Unterzeichnung des Protokolls im Jahre 1966 und die Wiederherstellung 
der diplomatischen Beziehungen vier Jahre später.
